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CHAPTER I

PRESENTATION OF THE DOCUMENT

In application of the recommendations of the Ministerial Monitoring Committee to harmonise policies within the context of the formulation of a community regulatory framework on competition within ECOWAS area, the work initiated by the ECOWAS Commission in collaboration with the UEMOA Commission and submitted to the Technical Thematic Group and the members States for consideration led to the preparation of three (3) documents:

• A Regional Competition Policy Framework document;
• Two Supplementary Act adopting: the Supplementary Community Competition Rules and the modalities of their application within ECOWAS; and Establishment, functions and operation of the Regional Competition Authority (RCA) for ECOWAS.

This Regional Competition Policy Framework document seeks to exhaustively clarify the basic elements of a competition policy and the form that it should take within the framework of regional integration.

It also highlights the components of a common regulation, a central element of a competition policy within an integrated setting, and the modalities for its implementation.

The policy is composed of the following five segments:

I. Competition Law and basic principles
This part presents the components of a competition policy and its benefits.
II. Case for a regional competition policy for ECOWAS
This part deals with the stakes of a regional competition policy within ECOWAS and its contribution to the consolidation of a common market.

III. Overview of the current state of competition law within ECOWAS
This part is devoted to the state of competition law within the region, laying emphasis on the areas of convergence between the rules adopted by UEMOA and those currently being prepared or in force in the other member States of ECOWAS.

IV. Highlights of a competition regulation within ECOWAS
This part relies on the status of competition within the draw up a draft regulation with its two components: the substantive rules relating to prohibited practices, and the institutional framework that focuses on the creation of a regional competition authority and its functions.

V. Conditions for implementation
This part places emphasis on the prerequisites for an effective implementation of regional competition rules, especially capacity building, internal reforms in the member States and the phases for implementation.

I. COMPETITION LAW: PURPOSE AND BASIC PRINCIPLES

Ongoing efforts to facilitate economic integration in the ECOWAS region and to promote regional economic growth will be meaningfully enhanced by the adoption of a sound regional framework for competition law. Competition law, also called antitrust law in some jurisdictions, lies at the core of the cluster of laws and regulations that cumulatively sustain the free market system. Informally defined, competition law is a set of rules (statutory and common law) used by governments, individuals and firms to evaluate and redress both public and private conduct that causes distortions to the "free flow" of competitive market interaction. Broadly speaking, the aims of competition law include:
the encouragement of free and open markets;
the provision of fair and equal competitive conditions to all market participants;
the promotion of allocative efficiency;
the maximization of consumer welfare; and
the establishment of transparency and fairness in regulatory processes.

These goals are framed within a competition policy context designed to uphold a liberal competitive order that maximizes national comparative advantages, encourages the free flow of products and services at the lowest prices, promotes innovation and strengthens production capacities in national and regional settings. Competition law thus provides the basic principles necessary to support free and open competition, in order to achieve, most fundamentally, an efficient allocation of economic resources and affiliated benefits. In sum, "[f]reedom to compete presupposes freedom to enter the market, freedom to develop and grow in the market, freedom from artificial combinations or aggregations, and freedom from monopoly pressure."

The basic principle is to take all necessary measures to establish equal opportunities (level playing ground) for all enterprises operating within the region in order to ensure fair competition and promote efficiency, economic growth and development. Competition policy recognises the logic of free and active competition on the markets, the importance of property laws, the need for increased international competition and the facilitation of entry into markets within the context that takes into account the level of development of each country and conscientiously seeks to correct structural imbalances and promote rapid growth and poverty reduction. In other words, the competition policy is founded on the dual principle of efficiency and fairness.

Competition policy is fundamentally related to the conditions that govern a system of free trade. There is a growing acknowledgement by national governments and international organizations that appropriate structure and vigorous enforcement of competition rules can promote
international trade. Indeed, in some instances, competition law can be used to address trade barriers and enhance the benefits of non-discrimination required by multilateral and regional trade regimes. Further, a well-designed competition policy can enhance regional integration efforts by minimizing the ability of private firms (and governments) to use national practices to avoid trade obligations.

The principal benefits associated with the adoption of a comprehensive competition regulatory framework—regardless of the socioeconomic status of the geopolitical entity implementing such framework, and irrespective of whether it is created at the national or supranational level—can be summarized graphically as follows:

In the context of a regional trade arrangement that involves the establishment of a customs union among Member States, such as ECOWAS, the adoption of regional competition regulatory scheme, along with its effective enforcement, also bring about supplementary benefits of assuring the realization of economic gains associated with regional trade integration as well as compensating, at least in part, for losses of revenue caused by the removal of trade barriers among Member States.

Figure 1
II. THE CASE FOR AN ECOWAS REGIONAL COMPETITION POLICY

The welfare benefits flowing from a successfully implemented regional competition policy are an important component of economic growth and development. It is unquestionable that competition law and policy have played, and continue to play a significant role in the economic prosperity of developed nations, which is reflected most significantly in strong economic growth, dynamic entrepreneurship, consumer welfare and social stability. These outcomes of a successful implementation of competition policies and law suggest strongly that ECOWAS Member States, all of which are striving to develop robust economies and stabilize market conditions, have much to benefit by seriously considering the adoption of a region-wide competition framework.

As the principal contributor behind innovation and growth in productivity, effective competition among firms in the ECOWAS Common Market must be seen as one of the key elements of a successful strategy to build up a competitive Community and reinvigorate the regional integration strategy. Although the ECOWAS Treaty does not explicitly mention “competition policy” as an area to be regulated at the regional level, the goals of the ECOWAS Treaty can be more fully and meaningfully accomplished by the creation of a common competition framework that can ensure that both private and public actors do not engage in activities, agreements or relationships that alter, undermine and ultimately frustrate the goals and benefits of trade liberalization in the region. In other words, competition policy is a necessary complement to trade policy and as such should be a central part of the ECOWAS system. A well designed and vigorously enforced regional competition regulation framework will help to concretely deliver on the goals of the ECOWAS integration strategy, by reducing the risk of trade disputes and policies of trade defences, contributing to increased productivity and economic growth, and ultimately raising the standard of living of the citizens of the Community. Furthermore, the development of a region-wide competition policy and regulation will enhance the Community’s ability to confront and address anti-
competitive behaviour by foreign firms, provide a basis for involvement and cooperation on negotiations regarding competition matters at the multilateral level, and establish a basis for the development of institutional competence on competition law for the region.

Compared to its major trading partners, ECOWAS is currently lagging behind substantially as regards “competitiveness” of the regional markets. Whilst important progress has been achieved in terms of market integration since the creation of the Common Market, many economic sectors in ECOWAS remain fragmented and are characterized by weak competition and persistently high prices that harm industries and consumers alike. It is uncontroversial that lack of competition in the Community curbs innovation and hinders research efforts. Dominant firms may be less inclined to pursue new products and services, which merely displace the profits from their existing products. In contrast, firms in a competitive marketplace relentlessly seek innovations to challenge existing companies in high profit markets and better respond to emerging market demands. Moreover, the emergence of new competitors threatens the temporary monopoly profits from innovation and increases the incentive of the firms presently in the market to shorten the innovation cycle. A competitive environment ensures that there is more than one potential innovator in the “race” to produce a superior product or find a superior process. In sum, strong competitive markets, encouraged and protected by an ECOWAS regional competition policy provides the best guarantee for companies in the ECOWAS region to increase their efficiency and innovative potential and is a key driver for economic development within the Community.

While in theory, virtually all regulations and policies will influence the economic environment in some form, what is emphasized here are those provisions that shape the competitive environment in which producers and consumers make decisions based on prevailing market conditions that affect price, quality and, ultimately, consumer decisions. Within the ECOWAS region, some regulations are likely to cause distortions in the operation of competition within the market, notably
through the uneven implementation by Member States of some reforms adopted by ECOWAS. Important examples include:
1) Elimination of Duties and Quantitative Restrictions
2) Re-export and Transit
3) Drawback and Compensation
4) Regional MFN and Third Country Agreements
5) Regional National Treatment.

The relationship between domestic competition policy and trade liberalization is evident if one considers that the objective of competition law is to promote a "contestable" territorial market. The idea of "contestability" is basic to competition and closely related to the economic objective of governments to increase the efficiencies of production and consumption in the marketplace using anti-competition rules to prohibit practices such as price fixing, collusion between firms for purposes of output restriction, abuse of dominant position, etc. The focus is upon consumers and the benefits they can derive from the proper functioning of competition, whether they be purchasing firms or the ultimate consumer.

It should be also noted that the notion of competition policy is somewhat broader than that of competition law, as the term can also encompass a whole basket of other regulatory (and deregulatory) activities of governments that relate to the conditions in the marketplace, either in protecting or creating competition. This can include systems of regulatory price controls over monopolies and policies dealing with privatization and deregulation. The term can be drawn broadly enough to also encompass the competition advocacy activities of national authorities and also the pro-competitive aspects of other laws, such as unfair trading practice laws or consumer protection laws. The term competition policy is often used to be inclusive of competition law.

For a customs union in particular, the core argument for a regional competition law can be expanded by considering the effects of anti-competitive practices on the trade liberalization commitments made by the Members to achieve free trade. The added element of customs union analyses emphasizes somewhat more the elimination of trade measures
(and their future potential to be used) in a formed single customs territory. Since a customs union has the capacity to provide for free internal movement for goods of origin as well as duly admitted third country goods, a focus on eliminating the underlying trade distortions caused by anti-competitive practices is also drawn more to the centre of attention by looking at effects of high and low prices of goods or services in the absence of a regional competition law.

1) Prices too high
If prices of exports from one market to another are "too high" due to export cartel activity or a cross border abuse of dominant position, then this affects the trade between regional partners. In this scenario, tariff cuts made by the importing country are being allocated not to the import country consumers, but to the export country producers. If it has a functioning domestic competition law, the importing country can take legal action against these foreign practices. In the usual case, however, enforcement against foreign actors is very difficult for domestic agencies where the evidence lies outside of the enforcing territory. The more central the investigative and enforcement mechanisms are made, the more likely it is that these practices will in fact be addressed and remedied. A more decentralized approach to this problem would rely wholly on national laws and agencies and attempt to create a cooperative framework among them in order to share information and other investigatory assistance.

2) Prices too low
If prices of exports are "too low," as in the case of dumping, then this may also be the result of anti-competitive exclusionary practices in the export country. If firms can successfully dump goods (i.e., sell them at a price that is below production cost), then they may be operating in a "closed" market whereby those dumped goods cannot be re-imported to challenge local prices. If there are no trade barriers in place, this "closure" may be created by a private set of exclusionary practices, perhaps in the form of vertical restraints in the distribution chain from a producer to the ultimate consumer. In this case the "trade solution" of parallel imports cannot be made effective, and this is then a competition law problem that is affecting trade between the Member States. It can be
addressed in the producing territory by the affected foreign firms if there is a competition law that can be invoked against anti-competitive vertical restraints and which also guarantees a non-discriminatory right of action on behalf of all complainants. This remedy can be available in a decentralized scheme relying only upon national laws that have a provision to address anti-competitive exclusionary practices. However, if there is no competition law in the producing market, but other regional Members do have competition laws, then the overall result is potentially highly damaging for free trade regimes and economic integration. Firms from the countries without laws can effectively dump goods on the other regional Members without being challenged. At the same time, firms from regional Members with functional competition law can always be challenged if they engage in dumping using exclusionary vertical restraints. The tension caused by a lack of reciprocity in competition law remedies may result in some Members utilizing trade measures (anti-dumping duties or safeguards) irrespective of the tariff cutting schedule and commitments in the region.

To summarize, preferential trade liberalization within the ECOWAS region should facilitate increased competition in the regional market but national or regional competition policies may also be necessary to provide recourse for injurious firm behaviour that responds to the removal of governmental barriers. There may be a stronger argument for an independent regional law and a centralized competition authority in the case of export restraint behaviour that affects trade between the Members. The problem of dumping can be resolved by effective national laws and intergovernmental approaches. Mere cooperation may be sufficient except in the case where exporting Members refuse to pass and implement national laws that address anti-competitive practices. Overall, a regional competition law will provide a common regional basis to deal with anticompetitive conduct that affects the regional market, while also providing reinforcement for national competition laws and the authorities responsible for their implementation at the national level. For those Member States who do not yet have the capacity or resources to enact national competition law, the regional law could serve as an important gap-filler.
III. OVERVIEW OF THE PRESENT STATE OF COMPETITION LEGISLATION IN THE ECOWAS COMMUNITY

A. UEMOA Community

The UEMOA Community's competition law is based on three Regulations and two Directives that were introduced in 2002, and that came into effect on 1 January 2003. The three Regulations cover concerted anti-competitive practices, abuses of a dominant market position, and state aid respectively. The two Directives apply to (1) transparency in financial relations between Member States and public enterprises, and between Member States and foreign or international organisations; and (2) cooperation between the UEOMA Commission and national competition authorities. In the UEMOA competition scheme, jurisdictional reach is limited only to anticompetitive practices capable of distorting competition within the Union market as a whole or within a "substantial part" thereof.

Substantively, the scheme follows a familiar pattern found in most competition laws in the developed world—i.e., its chief focus is aimed at: (1) agreements and concerted practices in restraint of trade; (2) mergers and acquisitions; and (3) monopolization—i.e., abuse of dominant market position. Second, the UEMOA competition framework regulates government-induced market distortions such as state aid and anticompetitive market conduct of state-owned enterprises. Specifically, the provisions of Article 88 of the UEMOA Treaty prohibit the following: a) agreements, associations and organized practices between companies that have the objective or the effect of restricting or distorting competition within the Union; b) all practices of one or several companies or associations amounting to abuse of a dominant position in the Common Market or in a significant part thereof; and c) government aid liable to distort competition by favouring certain companies and products. A fourth category of violations known as "anti-competitive practices attributable to government" was introduced on the basis of the provisions of Articles 4(a), 7 and 76 (c) of the UEMOA Treaty.
B. Other Member States

Of the other non-UEMOA ECOWAS Member States, Guinea has working on competition law, while the Gambia, Nigeria and Ghana currently have draft competition legislation.

The Commission based its work on the draft competition laws of Nigeria and Ghana.

Consistent with their common law legal systems, both Nigeria and Ghana recognize several legal grounds for dealing with particular practices that could be deemed anti-competitive. Nevertheless, the draft competition bills represent the first attempt by Nigeria and Ghana to offer a comprehensive legal framework to regulate competition. Below are brief summaries of the two laws.

1. Nigeria

The Nigeria Bill voids "[a]ll agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted or collaborative practices tending directly or indirectly to prevent, restrict or distort normal competition within the national market . . . ." Six types of specific anticompetitive agreements/coordinated actions listed include: (1) direct or indirect fixing of prices or of other trading conditions; (2) limits on or controls of production, markets, technical development, or investment; (3) division of market shares, customers or sources of supply; (4) boycotts; (5) discrimination in terms of trade and denial of access to arrangements or associations crucial to competition; and (6) tying arrangements.

The Nigerian Bill on competition also aims to eliminate both unilateral and joint "monopolization" market practices by prohibiting "[a]ll acts or behaviour constituting an abuse or acquisition and abuse of a dominant position of market power and enumerates examples, including: (1) the imposition of unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair trading conditions with the purpose of eliminating
competitors; (2) the imposition of limitations on production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of consumers; (3) the fixing of resale prices; (4) restricting imports of goods covered by overseas' trademarks with the aim of charging artificially inflated prices; (5) the application of unjustifiably dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions; (6) the refusal to transact business according to an enterprise's customary commercial terms; and (7) tying arrangements.

Further, the Nigerian law sets forth the rules applicable to the regulation of mergers and acquisitions (M&A). The Bill provides a right to an appellate review (in a court of law) of all final decisions laid down by the Nigerian Competition Commission's dispute resolution bodies.

2. Ghana

The Competition and Fair Trade Practices Bill of Ghana was drafted a decade ago and is yet to be enacted into law. Based on information from the Ghanaian Ministry of Commerce, it is expected that a new competition bill for Ghana will soon be crafted. Certain provisions in the current Ghanaian Draft Bill reflect minimum standards evident in many other jurisdictions. The Draft Bill prohibits a person from "enter[ing] into or giv[ing] effect to an agreement which" (a) is boycott, or (b) has the purpose of substantially lessening competition; or (c) has the purpose or effect of fixing prices. These prohibited agreements are defined as those which (1) limit or control production, markets, technical development or investment; (2) divide markets or sources of supply; (3) apply different terms to equivalent transactions; or (4) feature a tying arrangement. The Draft Bill prohibits resale price maintenance arrangements, "[i]n so far as [they] tend to restrict fair competition" and also contains a broad prohibition of exclusive dealing arrangements. The draft law bans a person with "substantial degree of power in a market" to "misuse" that power for the purpose of, inter alia, eliminating fair competition, preventing market entry, and "pricing goods or services at an excessively high level;" proscribes collusive tendering and collusive bidding at auctions. Finally, the Draft Bill provides the framework for the regulation of mergers and acquisitions.
Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As) that are "likely" to lead, to a "substantial lessening of competition in a market for the goods or services concerned" are prohibited.

In summary, the present role of competition law in ECOWAS Member States appears to be limited, but ongoing efforts in UEMOA, Nigeria and Ghana indicate recognition of the important role of competition law in promoting development goals and fostering a regulatory environment strongly conducive for economic growth. Based on the results of field research, other ECOWAS Member States are also interested in securing strong competitive national markets and recognize the important role of competition law in this effort. The development of competition law at the national levels will be well augmented by a regional competition framework. Tables in attached Appendices A and B identify (highlighted areas) points of convergence in substantive and procedural competition rules among the competition laws of UEMOA and the draft laws of Nigeria and Ghana. The similarities among the three bills should serve as an initial platform for the creation of a regional competition law for the ECOWAS Community as a whole.

IV. OUTLINES OF AN ECOWAS COMPETITION REGULATION

A. Substantive Rules

As regards substantive rules, the structure of the regional regulation should reflect the four (4) broad categories of "anticompetitive" market conduct that deserve the most extensive scrutiny under competition law. It also reflects areas of substantive convergence between the existing codes in the region (UEMOA, Nigeria and Ghana). At the top of the list of areas of convergence are:

(1) Agreements and Concerted Practices in Restraint of Trade—the regulation should aim to prohibit anti-competitive agreements (both vertical and horizontal), such as collusive price fixing, market sharing, output limitation, collective boycotts and tying arrangements.
Exemptions to the agreements/concerted practices prohibited by the regulation must relate only to pre-defined and pre-agreed subject matter that is specifically set forth.

(2) Monopolization Practices (i.e., uni-/bi-/multilateral abuses of a dominant market position)-the regulation should be designed to effectively cope with situations where one or more enterprises substantially or completely controls a class or species of business, and engages in anti-competitive conduct which has the effect of preventing or lessening competition considerably. Examples of anticompetitive acts falling within this area include, *inter alia*, predatory pricing, refusals to deal, and discriminatory behaviour.

(3) Mergers and Acquisitions - it is essential to establish in the Regulation an acceptable threshold for all mergers, proposed or otherwise, in all sectors of the economy, likely to prevent or lessen, or likely to prevent or lessen, competition substantially. The Commission should be in position to prevent or correct any merger that would significantly impede effective competition in the Common Market, in particular as a result of the creation or strengthening of a dominant position.

(4) State-Induced Competition Distortions - the regulation should declare as incompatible with the Common Market of the ECOWAS Community and thus prohibited any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition within the Community by favouring certain enterprises or the production of certain goods. Moreover, the regulation should make it explicitly clear that all of its proscriptions extend also to public enterprises and enterprises to which Member States grant special or exclusive rights.

It is recommended that the following arrangements and activities be specifically excluded from the ambit of the regulation:

a) labour relations matters involving activities of employees to protect their interests as such, and collective bargaining arrangements for fixing terms and conditions of employment;
b) agreements and business practices authorized by the proposed ECOWAS Competition Authority under conditions set forth in the supplementary Act;

c) activities expressly approved or required under any treaty between the ECOWAS Community and a third party or any instrument or agreement in relation thereto or flowing therefrom;

d) activities of professional associations responsible for developing or enforcing professional standards necessary for the protection of the public; and

e) activities exempted, after consultation with the Commission, by the ECOWAS Council of Ministers.

B. Institutional Framework

Successful implementation of a regional competition policy requires not only the careful design of substantive prohibitions, but also the formation of an effective body charged with competition regulation and enforcement. The approach recommended calls for independent regional action to create a central enforcement authority “the ECOWAS Competition Authority” with specifically enumerated mandates. Ideally, the proposed Competition Authority should be vested with powers, including:

• ongoing review of commercial activities in the Common Market in order to ascertain practices, which may distort efficient market conduct or which may adversely affect the economic interests of consumers;

• the conduct of inquiries and investigations into business practices in the Common Market to determine whether any enterprise is engaging in anti-competitive acts, as well as the conduct of other inquiries and investigations considered necessary or desirable in connection with matters within the scope of the regulation;

• the power to eliminate anti-competitive agreements and abuses of a dominant position and impose fines;
ECOWAS competition regulators will be required to interpret the phrase “may affect trade in the ECOWAS Community” during the application of the Community Rules to particular cases. There should be only one region-wide competition authority. This authority may consult with national competition structures and provide technical and other assistance where needed or at the instance of a Member State. Appeals of a decision of the region-wide competition authority can be taken before the ECOWAS Court of Justice (ECJ), and where necessary, the ECJ may invite the written opinion of national Supreme Courts and/or national competition structures to advise the Court in its deliberations.
ECOWAS REGIONAL COMPETITION POLICY FRAMEWORK

V. IMPLEMENTATION CONDITIONS

A. Capacity-Building

The ECOWAS Community, like other developing regions, will likely face significant challenges in developing the institutional capability for successful implementation of competition law and policy. This includes the administrative costs of setting up and operating the required institutions and of justifying the relative costs in light of benefits that are likely to accrue to citizens and the Community at large. Currently, ECOWAS faces, in general, either a lack or insufficiency of the human, technical, and institutional resources necessary to ensure the effective implementation of competition legislation. Enactment of a regional competition law will be of no effect unless it is supported by the requisite legal, human, and institutional infrastructure to ensure its proper and effective implementation in support of national development objectives.

Capacity building with respect to trade and competition law will be a long-term project for the ECOWAS Community and will involve both study and institution building. Given the imbalance in terms of experience as well as capacity with respect to competition legislation and institutions, it is important for ECOWAS to seek assistance on issues relating to the implementation of the proposed competition Community Rules while also drawing on experts familiar with the unique legal systems and values unique to developing and least-developed countries.

Within the ECOWAS Commission, staff members should be appointed or selected to specialize in competition-law-related work in order to allow them to develop expertise. Academic qualifications in economics or law, and experience in financial or other economic investigations, would be useful backgrounds for staff members. A staff training programme should be developed to improve and promote the abilities of staff members. Policies should be developed to encourage staff retention. The ECOWAS Competition Authority, as well as national competition structures of Member States, need to develop sound case
management procedures to ensure that cases are recorded and investigated adequately, and that work on them is completed within the time limits prescribed in the supplementary Act.

Specific needs in terms of capacity will involve:

- support for the conduct of a regional educational and training programme to develop the human resource skills base necessary to create a competition culture in each country and to generate the expertise needed to staff the new regional competition authority and to ensure that the new competition law is enforced and implemented effectively;

- support for training, scholarships for advanced studies, fellowships, internships and other means of exposing the staff of the new regional competition authority to the practices and methodologies of more mature competition authorities; and

- support for the creation of strong and competent national competition structures through the establishment of conditions that enable the more advanced regional or national competition structures to help train and assist other member countries' competition staff in the following areas: (i) handling of investigations, especially with respect to multinational corporations; (ii) development of competition-related information databases; (iii) competition advocacy; (iv) relationship of competition legislation, such as those relating to consumer protection, business incorporation, anti-trust and anti-monopoly, intellectual property rights, public utilities, trade and tariffs, etc.

B. Proposed Schedule of Implementation

The first step in implementing a regional competition framework is the adoption by ECOWAS of the proposed competition community Rules, which will establish the substantive competition law for the region as well as a regional competition Authority that will be charged with its implementation. It is encouraged that official processes that will lead
up to the adoption of the draft regulation be initiated as quickly as possible. Given recent transformation the ECOWAS Executive Secretariat to the Commission, this is a strategic time to include competition regulation in the newly established ECOWAS framework. While the proposed competition community Rules has been evaluated and assessed by international and regional experts, as well as experts within ECOWAS, the regulation deals solely with substantive and institutional issues that are central to the regional law.

An important second step is the drafting of rules of implementation necessary to give actual force to the operation of the proposed Competition Authority, including such matters as procedures to govern cross-boundary mergers and acquisitions; the range of fines that the proposed Competition Authority may assess including establishing maximum limits; procedures for filing complaints and initiating investigations, etc. Drafting Rules of implementation may begin as soon as possible in order to be ready to operationalize the work of the Authority once the competition community Rules has been adopted into law.

The third step involves the Selection and appointment of the leadership of the proposed Regional Competition Authority. This will require identifying minimum qualifications and desired levels of experience. The development of such qualifications should begin, as should the process of selecting the initial leadership team of the proposed Authority. It is emphasized that the individuals chosen to fill these positions must be well qualified both in terms of education and experience to provide strong intellectual and practical leadership to the Authority.

Once the leadership team of the proposed Competition Authority has been established, other staff positions within the Authority should be filled in a prompt fashion. It should be noted that the Authority need not be a large body–indeed. It is recommended that its development should be gradual and incremental in order to ensure that a solid institutional foundation is established.
In the fourth step, the ad hoc Advisory Board should be constituted. The Board should comprise of no more than 7 members, highly qualified in law, economics or other relevant discipline. The Board should assist in the development of internal rules of procedure for the authority, and provide counsel to the Authority and other ECOWAS institutions in matters pertaining to the regional competition law and its progressive implementation.

VI. CONCLUSION

It is well established that the design of competition rules, both substantive and procedural, is not simply a matter of applying basic economic principles and analyses, but is also inherently a political issue and has therefore by tradition been heavily influenced by interest group pressures and chosen policy objectives. The result has been notable variability in the regulation of competition law across countries and across time. Substantive differences in competition rules across jurisdictions reflect disagreements about, *inter alia*, the proper treatment of unfair or anticompetitive behaviour that does not immediately affect price or output levels, the appropriate regime for vertical restrictions, and the complex relationship between competition policy and broader national economic goals. Similarly, there is an ongoing debate, whether “competition” is, or should be, “a national goal for its own sake”—i.e., whether there are certain species of “anticompetitive” conduct (e.g., price fixing, division of markets, predation, bundling, *etc.*) that in all circumstances merit a “per se” holding of illegality without a “rule of reason” cost/benefit examination of its effects—or whether the definition of what constitutes “anticompetitive,” (and hence illegal) conduct should always be governed by a pragmatic scrutiny of elements such as consumer welfare and efficiency consequences. For example, should basic principles of competition be suspended when a particular business arrangement or government aid might produce more jobs in the region? The answer will clearly be different across jurisdictions. Finally, the design and effect of competition rules across jurisdictions differs due to
dissimilarities in institutional frameworks, enforcement mechanisms, as well as remedial and penalty structures of individual nations. The proposed regional competition framework for the ECOWAS region builds upon established legal principles in ECOWAS Member States, keeping the development objectives of the region as a central focus and maintaining a balance between national and regional jurisdiction to ensure the welfare of the ECOWAS region. The development of this framework will evolve continuously over time as Member States remain committed to securing the welfare benefits of trade liberalization by complying with rules designed to preserve the open market established by the ECOWAS Treaty.
### APPENDIX A
### COMPARISON OF SUBSTANTIVE PROVISIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STATUTORY PROVISION</th>
<th>PROHIBITION TYPES</th>
<th>NIGERIA</th>
<th>GHANA</th>
<th>UEMOA</th>
<th>ECOWAS PROPOSED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General Prohibition of Agreements and Concerted Practices Tending to Prevent, Restrict or Distort Competition</td>
<td>Concerted Practices</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Prohibition of Agreements that have the Purpose of Substantially Lessening Competition</td>
<td>Concerted Practices</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specific Prohibition of Agreements Fixing Prices (Directly and Indirectly) or Other Trading Conditions</td>
<td>Concerted Practices</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specific Prohibition of Limiting or Controlling Production, Markets, Technical Development, or Investment (Unilateral &amp; Concerted)</td>
<td>Concerted Practices, Monopolization</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specific Prohibition of Exclusive Dealing Arrangements</td>
<td>Concerted Practices, Monopolization</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Interest Exception to the Prohibition of Exclusive Dealing Arrangements</td>
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<td>x</td>
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<td>Kinship exception to the Prohibition of Exclusive Dealing Arrangements</td>
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<td>Specific Prohibition of Market/Customer/Sources of Supply Division Agreements</td>
<td>Concerted Practices</td>
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<td>Specific Prohibition of Boycotts</td>
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<td>Specific Prohibition of Agreements to Limit Competitor Access to Arrangements or Associations Crucial to Competition</td>
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<td>Concerted Practices</td>
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<tr>
<td>Specific Prohibition of Applying Dissimilar Conditions to Equivalent Transactions (Unilateral &amp; Concerted)</td>
<td>Concerted Practices, Monopolization</td>
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<td>✓</td>
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<td>Specific Prohibition of Tying Arrangements (Unilateral &amp; Concerted)</td>
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<td>Inclusion of a Distributive Agreement Efficiency Exception to the General Prohibition of Agreements/Concerted Practices in Restraint of Trade</td>
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<td>General Prohibition of Abuse or Acquisition &amp; Abuse of a Dominant Position in a Market</td>
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<td>Specific Prohibition Against the Imposition of Unfair Purchase or Selling Prices or Other Unfair Trading Conditions with the Purpose of Eliminating Competitors (Unilateral &amp; Concerted)</td>
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<td>✓</td>
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<td>Specific Prohibition of Resale Price Maintenance (Unilateral &amp; Concerted)</td>
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<td>STATUTORY PROVISION</td>
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<td>UEMOA</td>
<td>ECOWAS PROPOSED</td>
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<td>Specific Prohibition of Restrictions on the Importation of Goods Covered by</td>
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<td>Overseas' Trademarks with the Aim of Charging Artificial Inflated Prices</td>
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<td>Specific Prohibition of Misuse of Market Power for the Purpose of Preventing</td>
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<td>Specific Prohibition against the Misuse of Market Power by Adopting Specifications</td>
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<td>of Goods and Services Incompatible with Those of Others</td>
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<td>Authority of Regulatory Bodies to Seek out and Eliminate Concentrations of</td>
<td>Monopolization</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>N/A</td>
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<td>economic Power Likely to Lead to Detrimental Consequences for the</td>
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<td>Public Interest</td>
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<td>Specific Prohibition of the Misuse of Market Power by Pricing Goods at an</td>
<td>Monopolization</td>
<td>x</td>
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<td>Excessively High Level</td>
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<td>Specific Prohibition of Refusal to Transact Business According to an Enterprise's</td>
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<td>Customary Commercial Terms</td>
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<td>Inclusion of a Public Interest Exception to the Prohibition of Agreements in</td>
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<td>Restraint of Trade/Abuse of Dominant Market Position</td>
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<td>Prohibition of Misleading, Deceptive, and Unconscionable Market Practices</td>
<td>Unfair Competition</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<td>Specific Prohibition of Mergers and Acquisitions Tending to Enable Maintenance</td>
<td>Mergers &amp; Acquisitions</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
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<td>of Uncompetitive Prices for a Significant Period of Time</td>
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<tr>
<td>Specific Prohibition of Mergers and Acquisitions Tending to Enable the Creation</td>
<td>Mergers &amp; Acquisitions</td>
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<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<tr>
<td>of a Commercial Entity with Dominant Market Power and/or Tending to Reduce Trade/</td>
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<tr>
<td>Competition</td>
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<td>Extension of Competition Bill to Government-Induced Market Distortions</td>
<td>State-Induced Distortions</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<tr>
<td>Extension of Competition Bill to Practices Occurring Outside of National/Regional</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jurisdiction Having Domestic/Regional Anticompetitive Effects</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</table>
## APPENDIX B
### COMPARISON OF ENFORCEMENT & PROCEDURAL PROVISIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STATUTORY PROVISION</th>
<th>PROHIBITION TYPES</th>
<th>NIGERIA</th>
<th>GHANA</th>
<th>ECOWAS PROPOSED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Establishment of Specialized Government Agency (National/Regional) Charged with Competition Regulation</td>
<td>Enforcement</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provision of Immunity to National Competition Regulators</td>
<td>Procedural</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mandatory Inclusion of Private/NGO Sector Representatives in Decision-Making Organs of Competition Regulatory Bodies</td>
<td>Procedural</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓               (Appeal Body)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mandatory Disqualification from the Decision Making Process of Competition Regulators Burdened by a Conflict of Interest</td>
<td>Procedural</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Power of Competition Regulatory Bodies to Conduct Investigations and Inquiries</td>
<td>Enforcement</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power of Competition Regulatory Bodies to Summon Witnesses/Examine Documents</td>
<td>Enforcement</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power or Competition Regulatory Bodies to Enter and Search Premises</td>
<td>Enforcement</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power of Competition Regulatory Bodies to Order the termination of an Anticompetitive Agreement or Abusive Business Practice</td>
<td>Enforcement</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power of Competition Regulatory Bodies to Directly Impose Sanctions/Fines for Anticompetitive Market Conduct</td>
<td>Enforcement</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pre-Approval Investigations of Proposed Mergers and Acquisitions</td>
<td>Enforcement</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓               (To be set forth by the Commission)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Requirement to Notify a Regulatory Body About a Proposed Merger or Acquisition Affecting Domestic/Regional Market Irrespective of the Origin of the Transacting Firms</td>
<td>Procedural</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>X               (To be set forth by the Commission)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Legend:**
- X = means this provision has not been taken into account
- ✓ = means this provision has been taken into account
- N/A = means not available
CHAPTER II

SUPPLEMENTARY ACT A/SA.1/12/08
ADOPTING COMMUNITY COMPETITION RULES AND THE MODALITIES OF THEIR APPLICATION WITHIN ECOWAS

THE HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES

MINDFUL of Articles 7, 8 and 9 of the ECOWAS Treaty as amended establishing the Authority of Heads of State and Government and defining its composition and functions;

MINDFUL of Article 3 of the said Treaty that provides for the harmonization and coordination of National Policies in the area of trade as a means of maintaining and enhancing economic stability within the sub region;

RECOGNIZING that the economy in the ECOWAS Common market must be efficient and competitive in order to promote and facilitate conditions necessary for economic growth in the region;

CONVINCED that an effective regulatory environment is advantageous for the promotion and sustainability of a vibrant economy within the Common market and the domestic economies of ECOWAS Member States;

NOTING that the promulgation of Community Competition Rules is consistent with the economic development objectives of ECOWAS Member States;

RECOGNIZING also that the protection of market conditions through the effective implementation of competition rules is consistent with
international best practices and is in the interest of economic integration within the ECOWAS region;

DESIROUS of endowing ECOWAS with competition rules that are consistent with international standards in order to promote fairness in trade and effective liberalization of trade;

HAVING CONSIDERED THE OPINION of the ECOWAS Parliament;

ON THE RECOMMENDATION of the Sixty First Ordinary Session of the Council of Ministers, held in Ouagadougou from 27 to 29 November 2008.

AGREE AS FOLLOWS:

ARTICLE 1: DEFINITIONS

(1) In this Supplementary Act, unless the context otherwise requires:

(a) "acquire" in relation to:
   i) goods: means to obtain by way of gift, purchase or exchange, lease, hire or hire purchase;
   ii) services: means to accept benefit from or to perform the service;
   iii) intellectual property rights: means to obtain by license, assignment or government grant;

(b) "agreement" means any agreement, arrangement or understanding, whether oral or in writing and whether or not it is intended to be legally enforceable;

(c) "anti-competitive practice" any practice coming from a physical or moral person the object or effect of which is to restrain competition to the disadvantage of the common market;

(d) "Authority" means the ECOWAS Competition Authority established under Article 13 of this Supplementary Act;
(e) "authorized officer" means any person appointed as such by the ECOWAS Competition Authority for the purposes of this Supplementary Act;

(f) "concerted practice" means a practice involving direct or indirect contacts between competitors falling short of an actual agreement;

(g) "consumer" means a person, partnership or body corporate or incorporate acquiring goods or services;

(h) "economic activity" means economic activities involving:
   i) manufacturing, producing, transporting, acquiring, supplying, storing, distribution and otherwise dealing in goods for gain or reward; and
   ii) acquiring, supplying and otherwise dealing in services for gain or reward;

(i) "control" in relation to a company means the power of a physical or moral person to secure by means of:
   i) the holding of shares or the possession of voting power in relation to that company; or
   ii) any other power conferred by the company's constituent documents or other documents regulating the company,
   iii) the effective exercise of power of decision within the company; so that the company's business is conducted in accordance with that individual's wishes.

(j) "Council" means the ECOWAS Council of Ministers, the composition of which is defined in the new Article 10 of Supplementary Protocol A/SP.1/06/06;

(k) "document" means written information including electronic records;

(l) "dominant position" is as defined in Article 6(I) of this Supplementary Act;
(m) "enterprise" means any person or group of persons engaged in business;

(n) "Executive Director" means the Executive Director of the ECOWAS Competition Authority, appointed in accordance with Article 13 of this Supplementary Act;

(o) "goods" means all kinds of property other than real property, money, securities or intangible property;

(p) "Member State(s)" means any Member State or Member States of ECOWAS as defined in Article 2, paragraph 2, of the Revised ECOWAS Treaty;

(q) "person" means an individual, partnership, body whether corporate or not or any association of persons;

(r) "price" means any charge or fee or valuable consideration of any description;

(s) "products" includes goods and services;

(t) "relevant market" means the supply, to a geographical area, of products which the consumer regards as substitutable in terms of price and use;

(u) "service" means a performance of any description, whether industrial, commercial, professional or otherwise;

(v) "supply" means, in relation to:
   i) goods: to sell, rent, lease or otherwise dispose of goods or an interest therein or a right thereto, or offer so as to dispose of such goods, right or interest;
   ii) services: to sell, rent or otherwise provide services or offer to provide such services;

(w) "trade" means any business, industry, profession or occupation relating to the supply or acquisition of products.
(2) For the purposes of this Supplementary Act:
(a) any two companies are to be treated as interconnected companies if one of them is an affiliate of the other or both are subsidiaries of the same company; and
(b) a group of interconnected companies shall be treated as a single enterprise.

(3) For the purposes of this Supplementary Act, a company is a subsidiary of another company if it is controlled by that other company;

(4) Every reference in this Supplementary Act to the term “market” is a reference to a market within the ECOWAS Community for products as well as other articles that, as a matter of fact and based on reasonable commercial practice, may be substituted for them in terms of price and use;

(5) In this Supplementary Act, any reference to the terms “common market” means the ECOWAS common market being established;

(6) References in this Supplementary Act to the “lessening of competition” shall, unless the context otherwise stipulates, include references to hindering or preventing competition in the Common Market, or in a national market when such lessening of competition has a demonstrable effect on the Common Market;

(7) For the purposes of this Supplementary Act, the effect on competition in a relevant market shall be determined by reference to all factors that affect competition in that market, including competition (actual or potential) from products supplied or likely to be supplied by any person not resident or carrying on business in the ECOWAS Common Market.

ARTICLE 2:
ADOPTION OF THE COMMUNITY COMPETITION RULES

The Community Competition Rules and the modalities for their implementation, as defined in this Supplementary Act, are hereby adopted.
ARTICLE 3: OBJECTIVES

The purposes of this Supplementary Act are to:

(a) promote, maintain and encourage competition and enhance economic efficiency in production, trade and commerce at the regional level;

(b) prohibit any anti-competitive business conduct that prevents, restricts or distorts competition at the regional level;

(c) ensure the consumers' welfare and the protection of their interests;

(d) expand opportunities for domestic enterprises in Member States to participate in world markets.

ARTICLE 4: SCOPE

(1) This Supplementary Act applies to agreements, practices, mergers and distortions caused by Member States which are likely to have an effect on trade within ECOWAS. The Rules shall concern notably acts, which directly affect regional trade and investment flows and/or conduct that may not be eliminated other than within the framework of regional cooperation.

(2) The under-listed agreements and activities may be excluded from the scope of labour-related issues, notably activities of employees for the legal protection of their interests;

(a) collective bargaining agreements between employers and employees for the purpose of fixing terms and conditions of employment;

(b) agreements and trade practices approved by a regional competition organ of ECOWAS where these trade practices are authorized under this Supplementary Act;

(c) activities expressly exempted by virtue of any treaty or any instrument or agreement in relation thereto or flowing therefrom, so long as the activities are not inconsistent with the purposes of this Supplementary Act;

(d) activities of professional associations designed to develop or enforce professional standards of competence reasonably necessary for the protection of the public;
(e) such other activity declared, after consultation with the ECOWAS Competition Authority, by the Council of Ministers.

(3) The Community rules on competition shall also be applicable to state enterprises.

ARTICLE 5:
AGREEMENTS AND CONCERTED PRACTICES
IN RESTR AINT OF TRADE

(1) The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the ECOWAS Common Market: all agreements between enterprises, decisions by associations of enterprises and concerted practices which may affect trade between ECOWAS Member States and the object or effect of which are or may be the prevention, restriction, distortion or elimination of competition within the Common Market, and in particular those which:

(a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices, terms of sale, or any other, trading conditions;
(b) limit or control production, markets, technical development, or investment;
(c) share markets, customers, or sources of supply;
(d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties; thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; or
(e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts.

(2) Any agreement or decision prohibited under the sub-paragraph 1 of this Article shall be automatically void and of no legal effect in any Member State of the ECOWAS Community.
ARTICLE 6: ABUSE OF DOMINANT POSITION

(1) For the purposes of this Supplementary Act, one or more enterprises hold a dominant position in a relevant market if, singularly or collectively, it/they possess a substantial share of the market that enables it/them to control prices or to exclude competition.

(2) Any abuse, or acquisition and abuse of a dominant position by one or more enterprises within the ECOWAS Common Market or in a substantial part thereof shall be prohibited as incompatible with the Common Market in so far as it may affect trade between Member States.

Such abuse may, in particular, consist of:
(a) limiting access to a relevant market or otherwise unduly restraining competition;
(b) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair trading conditions;
(c) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of consumers;
(d) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(e) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts.

ARTICLE 7: MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS

(1) Every merger, takeover, joint venture, or other acquisition or business combination including interconnected directorships whether of a horizontal, vertical, or conglomerate nature between or among enterprises are prohibited where the resultant market share in the ECOWAS Common Market, or any significant part thereof, attributable to any good, service, line of commerce, or activity affecting commerce shall result in abuse of dominant market position resulting in a substantial reduction of competition.
(2) Any merger prohibited by paragraph (1) of this Article shall be automatically void and of no effect in any Member State of ECOWAS.

(3) Mergers, acquisitions or concentrations of enterprises prohibited by virtue of paragraph 1 of this Article may be authorized or exempted if the transaction concerned is in the public interest.

ARTICLE 8: STATE AID

(1) Except as otherwise provided in this Supplementary Act, any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favoring certain enterprises or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Member States, be incompatible with the ECOWAS Common Market.

(2) The following shall be compatible with the Common Market:
   (a) aid having a social character, granted to individual consumers, provided that such aid is granted without discrimination related to the origin of the products concerned; and
   (b) aid to remedy the damage caused by natural disasters or exceptional occurrences.

(3) The following may be considered to be compatible with the ECOWAS Common Market:
   (a) aid to promote the socioeconomic development of areas of the Community where the standard of living is exceptionally low or in which there is serious underemployment;
   (b) aid to promote the execution of an important project of Community interest or to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State;
   (c) aid to facilitate the development of certain economic activities or of certain economic areas, where such aid does not adversely affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest;
   (d) aid to promote culture and heritage conservation where such aid does not affect trading conditions and competition in the
ARTICLE 13: APPLICATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMUNITY COMPETITION RULES

(1) A structure to be known as the Regional Competition Authority responsible for the implementation of the present Supplementary Act within ECOWAS shall be established.

(2) The organizational and operating rules of the Authority shall be defined in a Regulation.

(3) In the implementation of the Community Competition Rules, the Regional Authority shall collaborate with other existing competition agencies. (UEMOA)

(4) A Consultative Competition Committee composed of members who are experts in the area of competition is hereby set up. Each Member State shall be represented by two of such members who can be replaced by other members in case of incapacity. The operation of the Committee shall be governed by rules of procedure adopted by the Commission after consultation with the Committee.

(5) When the Committee has to deal with an issue related to an important economic sector, the delegation from each Member State shall include a representative of the national Regulatory Agency of the relevant sector or at least a representative of the professional association of the said sector.

(6) For the purposes of application of the Community Competition Rules, the Member States shall adopt all measures they deem appropriate, on condition they are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Supplementary Act.

(7) The modalities for the implementation of this Act shall be defined in a Regulation to be adopted by the Council of Ministers.

ARTICLE 14: AMENDMENT AND REVISION

(1) Any Member State, the Council of Ministers, the ECOWAS Parliament and the ECOWAS Commission may submit proposals for the amendment or revision of this Supplementary Act.
(2) Proposals not emanating from the ECOWAS Commission shall be submitted to it. The Commission shall communicate all proposals for amendment and revision to the Member States not later than thirty (30) days after their receipt. Upon expiration of the thirty (30) days notice given to Member States, the Authority of Heads of State and Government shall examine the proposals for amendment or revision of the Supplementary Act.

(3) The amendments or revisions shall be adopted by the Authority of Heads of State and Government in accordance with the provisions of Article 9 of the ECOWAS Treaty. The adopted amendments and revisions shall enter into force upon their publication in the Official Journal of the Community.

ARTICLE 15: PUBLICATION

This Supplementary Act shall be published by the ECOWAS Commission in the Official Journal of the Community within Thirty (30) days of its signature by the Chairperson of the Council of Ministers. It shall also be published by each Member State in its National Gazette within thirty (30) days after notification by the Commission.

ARTICLE 16: ENTRY INTO FORCE

1. This Supplementary Act shall enter into force upon its publication. Consequently, signatory Member States and the Institutions of ECOWAS undertake to commence the implementation of its provisions on its entry into force,

2. This Supplementary Act is annexed to the ECOWAS Treaty of which it is an integral part.

ARTICLE 17: DEPOSITORY AUTHORITY

This Supplementary Act shall be deposited with the Commission which shall transmit certified true copies thereof to all Member States and shall register it with the African Union, the United Nations and such other organizations as Council may determine.
ECOWAS REGIONAL COMPETITION POLICY FRAMEWORK

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, WE, THE HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT OF THE ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES, HAVE SIGNED THIS SUPPLEMENTARY ACT

DONE AT ABUJA THIS 19TH DAY OF DECEMBER, 2008

IN SINGLE ORIGINAL IN THE ENGLISH, FRENCH AND PORTUGUESE LANGUAGES, ALL THREE (3) TEXTS BEING EQUALLY AUTHENTIC
SUPPLEMENTARY ACT A/SA.2/12/08
ON THE ESTABLISHMENT, FUNCTIONS AND OPERATION OF
THE REGIONAL COMPETITION AUTHORITY FOR ECOWAS

THE HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES

MINDFUL of Articles 7, 8 and 9 of the ECOWAS Treaty as amended establishing the Authority of Heads of State and Government and defining its composition and functions;

MINDFUL of Article 3 of the said Treaty that provides for the harmonization and coordination of National Policies in the area of trade as a means of maintaining and enhancing economic stability within the sub region;

MINDFUL of Supplementary Act adopting the Community Competition Rules and the Modalities for its implementation within ECOWAS;

REAFFIRMING that the implementation of the Community Competition Rules is necessary to promote the economic integration of Member States and stimulate region-wide economic growth;

AWARE that the proper and optimum application of the community rules requires the establishment of a regional body, endowed with appropriate powers, as well as the definition of adequate procedures capable of guaranteeing its efficiency;

RECOGNISING the need to draw inspiration from existing regional and sub-regional competition bodies in order to enhance the functioning of the ECOWAS regional body;
DESIRous of endowing the Community with a regional Competition Authority and to define its functions and operation;

HAVING CONSIDERED THE OPINION of the ECOWAS Parliament;

ON THE RECOMMENDATION of the Sixty first Session of the Council of Ministers, held in Ouagadougou from 27 to 29 November 2008.

AGREE AS FOLLOWS:

ARTICLE 1
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ECOWAS COMPETITION AUTHORITY

There is hereby established a regional body to be known as the ECOWAS Competition Authority, (The Authority) which shall be charged with the implementation of the ECOWAS Community Competition Rules.

ARTICLE 2
COMPOSITION AND APPOINTMENT

(1) The Authority shall be headed by an Executive Director, assisted by two (2) Directors and staff necessary for its smooth functioning.

(2) The Executive Director shall be a Statutory Appointee and shall be recruited and appointed by the Council of Ministers on the proposal of the Ministerial Committee on the Selection and Evaluation of the Performance of Statutory Appointees, after evaluation of three candidates who are nationals of the State to which the post has been allocated.

(3) The Executive Director shall be recruited for a non-renewable period of four (4) years.

(4) The Directors and other staff shall be recruited in accordance with the ECOWAS Staff Rules and Regulations on appointment.

(5) Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 of this article, and within a transitional period, the Executive Director and the two
Directors shall be recruited on the basis of a contract for a period not exceeding 8 years maximum and shall be directly attached to the President of the Commission.

ARTICLE 3: DUTIES

In accordance with the provisions of Article 2 of this Supplementary Act, the ECOWAS Competition Authority shall perform the following functions:

(a) keep under review commercial activities in the Community Market with a view to ascertaining practices which may distort the efficient operation of the market conduct or which may adversely affect the economic interests of consumers;

(b) carry out on its own initiative or at the request of private persons or government officials from the Member States or of the Community Court of Justice, such investigations in relation to the conduct of business in the Common Market as will enable it to determine whether any enterprise is engaging in business practices in contravention of the Supplementary Act adopting the Common Competition Rules.

(c) preclude and eliminate anti-competitive practices amounting to an abuse of a dominant market position;

(d) propose for adoption, through the ECOWAS Commission, to the Council of Ministers, the setting and periodic review of the schedule of fines and various levels of compensation to be applied within the framework of this Supplementary Act;

(e) at the request of the executive and judicial authorities of Member States and Community institutions, issue advisory opinions regarding the interpretation and application of the Community Competition Rules;

(f) co-operate with national and regional competition agencies in taking measures necessary to ensure implementation of the obligations arising from this Supplementary Act;
(g) co-operate with and assist any association, intergovernmental organization, or body of persons in developing and promoting the observance of standards of conduct for the purpose of ensuring compliance with the provisions of this Supplementary Act;

(h) make available to persons engaged in business as well as to consumers, general information with respect to their rights and obligations under the Supplementary Act adopting the Community Competition Rules;

(i) undertake studies and publish reports and information regarding matters affecting the interests of consumers in the implementation of the Supplementary Act adopting the Community Competition Rules;

(j) as input into the activity report of the Community, prepare and transmit to the President of the ECOWAS Commission, an interim report and an annual report on the activities of the Authority;

(k) contribute to the training of the staff of national competition structures and provide them with support notably in the management of investigations, creation of a competition-related data base, advocacy on competition and consumer protection.

ARTICLE 4: POWERS

(1) Without prejudice to the provisions relating to the powers of the Community Court of Justice, the Authority, in the execution of its functions under this Supplementary Act, shall have power to issue injunctions:

(i) ordering the termination of a contract;
(ii) prohibiting the conclusion or implementation of a contract;
(iii) prohibiting the imposition of terms external to any transaction, the effect of which is to reduce competition;
(iv) prohibit discrimination or preferences in price matters and other related aspects, and
(vi) requiring the transparent publication of commercial information (prices, scale of rates, general terms of sale, product composition and expiry dates);
Subject to the provisions of the present Supplementary Act, the authority shall undertake the necessary actions for the effective performance of its functions.

(2) In considering applications for authorizations, mergers, acquisitions or business combinations as provided for in Article 7, paragraph 3, of the Supplementary Act adopting the Community Competition Rules, the Authority shall, in particular, take into consideration the following data:

(i) the position on the market of the businesses concerned as well as their economic and financial power;
(ii) the structure of all the markets concerned;
(iii) the actual or potential competition from enterprises located within or outside the ECOWAS Common market;
(iv) the effects of the transaction on suppliers and buyers;
(v) the legal or other obstacles to entry as well as the supply and demand trends in respect of the goods and services considered; and
(vi) any potential for technical and economic progress created by the proposed transaction, which may be in the interest of the consumer and may not constitute a hindrance to competition.

(3) For the purpose of granting to any person and to any Member State, the authorization provided for in Article 12 of the Supplementary Act adopting the Community Competition Rules, which relates to authorization for the conclusion or execution of an agreement for the purpose of engaging in business practices likely to violate prohibitions imposed by that Supplementary Act, the Authority shall take into consideration, the following factors, among others:

(i) the vulnerability of the sectors concerned;
(ii) the impact that the said agreement or practices will have on the capacity of small and medium enterprises to effectively compete;
(iii) the promotion of socio-economic development within the Community; and
(iv) any other relevant consideration.
(4) The Authority may withdraw or modify an authorization if it observes that:
   (i) the conditions of the grant have changed;
   (ii) the information provided in support of the application for authorization were false or misleading; or
   (iii) the conditions and obligations governing the grant of authorization are violated.

(5) The Authority shall, before canceling or reviewing any authorization, forward a notification in writing to the interested party, detailing the reasons of its decision and informing it of its right to request hearing by the Authority on the matter within a deadline to be specified in the said notification.

(6) The Authority shall keep a register of authorizations granted, in a form that it shall determine. The register shall be open to consultation by the public.

(7) The Authority shall obtain such information as it considers necessary to assist it in its investigations and inquiries and, where it considers appropriate, shall examine and obtain verification of documents submitted to it.

(8) The Authority shall have power to:
   (i) summon and examine witnesses;
   (ii) demand any document to be communicated for examination;
   (iii) require that any document submitted to it be supported by an affidavit;
   (iv) require the furnishing of such returns or information as it may require within such period as it may specify by notice; and
   (v) adjourn any investigation or inquiry, where necessary.

(9) The Authority may hear orally or in writing from any person who in its opinion will be affected by an investigation or inquiry being carried out by the Authority.

(10) The Authority may require an enterprise or such other person as it considers appropriate to provide information concerning products
manufactured, produced or supplied by that person as the Authority may deem necessary to determine whether the conduct of the business in relation to the products constitutes an anti-competitive practice.

(11) If the information specified in paragraph (7) of this Article is not furnished to the satisfaction of the Authority, the Authority may draw conclusions on the basis of information available to it.

(12) All enterprises or persons summoned to attend and give evidence or produce documents at any sitting of the Authority shall be bound to obey the summons served thereupon.

(13) Hearings of the Authority shall take place in public but the Authority may, whenever the circumstances so warrant, conduct a hearing in camera.

(14) A person commits an offence and is liable to a fine if that person:

(a) without sufficient cause, fails or refuses to:
   i) appear before the Authority when a summons is validly served;
   ii) produce a document which he/she is required by such summons to produce;

(b) destroys any record likely to be required for an investigation that has commenced under this Supplementary Act, with intent to mislead the Authority or to prevent or impede the investigation;

(c) being a witness, leaves a sitting of the Authority without the Authority's permission;

(d) willfully:
   i) insults any member or officer of the Authority; or
   ii) obstructs or interrupts the proceedings of the Authority.
ARTICLE 5: POWER OF ENTRY AND SEARCH

The Authority may, where necessary and for the purpose of gathering evidence of the involvement of a person or body corporate in an anti-competitive conduct or conduct likely to be anti-competition, request authority from the competent national institutions to:

(i) carry out a search in accordance with legal procedures;
(ii) inspect and remove temporarily in accordance with legal procedures, for the purpose of making copies, any documents or extracts under the control of any person.

ARTICLE 6
DISCONTINUANCE OF INVESTIGATION OR INQUIRY

At any stage of an investigation or inquiry under this Supplementary Act, if the Authority, or an investigator appointed by it, is of the opinion that the matter being investigated or subject to inquiry does not justify further investigation or inquiry, the Authority may discontinue the inquiry or investigation. Where the Authority decides on discontinuance, it shall submit a report in writing to the President of the Commission within thirty (30) days and informs the parties concerned, within the same time limit, of this decision, stating the reasons for discontinuance.

ARTICLE 7
SANCTIONS OR MEASURES AGAINST ANTI-COMPETITIVE PRACTICES

(1) Where the Authority, upon conclusion of investigations, is convinced that there is evidence to presume a violation of the provisions of this Supplementary Act adopting the Community Competition Rules, it shall pronounce the appropriate sanctions against the offender(s). An appeal against the Authority's decision may be filed before the Community Court of Justice.

(2) In addition to the sanction provided in Article 4, paragraph 14, and Article 8, paragraph 2, the Authority may also pay compensations as provided for in Article 8, paragraph 3, Article 9, paragraph 3, and Article 10, of this Supplementary Act.
(3) Decisions taken by the Authority in accordance with paragraphs 1 and 2 of this article may be subject to appeal. The Community Court of Justice shall sit as an appellate court and its decision shall be final.

ARTICLE 8
ACTION BY THE AUTHORITY IN RELATION TO AGREEMENTS AND CONCERTED PRACTICES IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE

(1) Unless otherwise provided, when the Authority determines that any agreement, decision or concerted practice constitutes a violation of the Supplementary Act adopting the Community Competition Rules, it proceeds in accordance with the provisions of Article '5 paragraph 1 of this Supplementary Act.

(2) Any person who executes an arrangement prohibited by Article 5 of the Supplementary Act adopting the Community Competition Rules and who fails to terminate such arrangement within a time determined by the Authority commits an offence and is liable to a fine.

(3) Any person who has suffered losses as a result of any prohibited anti-competitive arrangement may apply for compensation to the Authority. The Authority and the Community Court of Justice shall order the parties to such prohibited arrangement to pay to the applicant(s) such compensation as they shall determine.

ARTICLE 9
ACTION BY THE AUTHORITY IN RELATION TO ABUSE OF DOMINANT MARKET POSITION

(1) Where the Authority has reasons to believe that one or more enterprises holding a dominant position in a relevant market has/have abused or is/are abusing such position, the Authority shall conduct an investigation into the matter.

(2) If the Authority finds, after its investigation, that the abuse referred to in paragraph (1) has occurred or is occurring and that such abuse
has had, is having or is likely to have the effect of substantially lessening competition in the Community Market, the Authority shall prepare a report indicating the practices that constitute the abuse and shall:

(a) notify the enterprises involved of its findings; and

(b) order the enterprises involved to cease the abusive practice immediately or not later than on a date determined by the Authority.

(3) Any person who has suffered losses as a result of any anti-competitive practice prohibited under Article 8 of the Supplementary Act adopting the Community Competition Rules may apply to the Authority for compensation. The Authority may order the infringer or infringers to pay to the applicant or applicants such compensation as it shall determine.

ARTICLE 10
ACTION BY THE AUTHORITY IN RELATION TO STATE AID AND ANTI-COMPETITIVE PRACTICES OF STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES

A person or Member State who has suffered losses as a result of any anti-competitive practice prohibited under the Supplementary Act adopting the Community Competitive Rules may apply to the Authority for compensation and the Authority may, if it is satisfied that the circumstances of the case so warrant, order the infringer or infringers to pay a compensation to the applicant.

ARTICLE 11
MODALITIES FOR ENFORCEMENT OF DECISIONS TAKEN BY THE AUTHORITY AND THE COMMUNITY COURT OF JUSTICE

(1) Decisions of the Authority and of the Community Court of Justice that entail pecuniary obligations on individuals and or corporate bodies shall be binding.
(2) Enforcement, which shall be submitted by the Senior Registrar of the court of the Member State concerned, shall be governed by the rules of civil procedure prevailing in the said Member State.

(3) The enforcement formula shall be applied by the national authority appointed by the Government of each Member State, without any other control except for that of verifying the authenticity of the decision.

(4) Member States shall appoint the competent national authority, which shall receive or implement the decisions of the Competition Authority and those of the Community Court of Justice and notify their appointment to the latter.

(5) Enforcement of the decision referred to in paragraph (1) of this article may be suspended only by a decision of the Community Court of Justice.

**ARTICLE 12**

FINANCING OF THE ACTIVITIES OF THE COMPETITION AUTHORITY

The activities of the Competition Authority shall be funded by budget allotment allocated in accordance with the provisions of the ECOWAS Treaty and from any other source that the Council of Ministers may determine.

**ARTICLE 13: ACCOUNTS AND AUDIT**

(1) The accounts of the Authority shall be audited annually by the External Auditors of the Institutions of the Community.

(2) A statement of accounts audited in accordance with paragraph (1) shall be presented to the Council of Ministers through the Administration and Finance Commission.

**ARTICLE 14: RULES OF PROCEDURE**

All other issues relating to the organization of the Authority and the rules governing its functioning not set out in this Supplementary Act or in a Regulation shall be defined in the Rules of Procedure of the Competition Authority as approved by the Council.
ARTICLE 15: AMENDMENT AND REVISION

(1) Any Member State, the Council of Ministers, the ECOWAS Parliament and the ECOWAS Commission may submit proposals for the amendment or revision of this Supplementary Act.

(2) Proposals not emanating from the ECOWAS Commission shall be submitted to it. The Commission shall forward all proposals for amendment and revision to the Member States not later than thirty (30) days after their receipt. Upon expiration of the thirty (30) days notice given to Member States, the Authority of Heads of State and Government shall examine the proposals for amendment or revision of the Supplementary Act.

(3) The amendments or revisions shall be adopted by the Authority of Heads of State and Government in accordance with the provisions of Article 9 of the ECOWAS Treaty. The adopted amendments and revisions shall enter into force upon their publication in the Official Journal of the Community.

ARTICLE 16: PUBLICATION

This Supplementary Act shall be published by the ECOWAS Commission in the Official Journal of the Community within Thirty (30) days of its signature by the Chairperson of the Council of Ministers. It shall also be published by each Member State in its National Gazette within thirty (30) days after notification by the Commission.

ARTICLE 17: ENTRY INTO FORCE

1. This Supplementary Act shall enter into force upon its publication. Consequently, signatory Member States and the Institutions of ECOWAS undertake to commence the implementation of its provisions on its entry into force,

2. This Supplementary Act is annexed to the ECOWAS Treaty of which it is an integral part.
ARTICLE 18: DEPOSITORY AUTHORITY

This Supplementary Act shall be deposited with the Commission which shall transmit certified true copies thereof to all Member States and shall register it with the African Union, the United Nations and such other organizations as Council may determine.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, WE, THE HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT OF THE ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES, HAVE SIGNED THIS SUPPLEMENTARY ACT

DONE AT ABUJA, THIS 19TH DAY OF DECEMBER 2008

IN SINGLE ORIGINAL IN THE ENGLISH, FRENCH AND PORTUGUESE LANGUAGES, ALL THREE (3) TEXTS BEING EQUALLY AUTHENTIC